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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DON S. SMITH and BRIGHAM H. SMITH, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
R. L. WARR, 
Defendant and Cross-
complainant and Appellant, 
vs. 
J. H. EHLERS, EVELYN P. BOYCE, 
LOIS P. CONNELL, 
Defendants and Cross-
defendants and Respondents 
Case No. 14565 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT J. H. EHLERS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant appeals from a judgment in his favor and 
against Respondents based on a breach of two (2) real estate 
contracts. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant's cross-complaint against Respondents was tried 
without jury before the Honorable James S, Sawaya on January 16, 
1976, at which time the lower court denied the Appellant's claim 
for damages based on benefit of the bargain theory and limited 
recovery to Appellant's out-of-pocket loss and denied 
Appellant's request for attorney!s fees and costs of court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent, J. H. Ehlers, asks the court to affirm 
the judgment of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent, J. H. Ehlers, agrees with the statement 
of facts set forth in the Appellant's brief, except as follows 
and with the following additions. 
Exceptions: 
1. Appellant, R. L. Warr, never made a tender to 
the Respondents of the balance due on the contracts and never made 
application with a bank or lending institution to obtain the 
necessary money to pay off the contracts, (R 279) Whether the 
Appellant was "prepared" to pay the remaining amount due under the 
contracts, as the Appellant's brief claims, is seriously question-
able. (R 276) 
Additions: 
1. Appellant, R. L. Warr, had actual and construct-
ive knowledge and notice of the adverse claims of the Plaintiffs 
in the principal action from the time of the execution of the real 
estate contracts. The Appellant was on the property prior to the 
execution of the real estate contract in August, 1973. (R 276) 
Although Appellant's brief states that the Appellant did not know 
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that a lawsuit had been filed until June 16, 1975, the Appellant 
talked with Utah Title Insurance Company in the summer of 1974 
and was informed that there was a possibility of a lawsuit on the 
property. (R 274) Furthermore, Appellant, R. L. Warr, said that 
one reason he did not attempt to take possession of the property 
in August, 1973, was because he was trying to stay out of trouble. 
(R 281) Appellant, R. L. Warr, also testified that he made no 
effort to find out who was using the land between the contract date 
and the first year. (R 281) Appellant testified at the trial that 
he made such an effort the following year after purchasing the 
property, approximately in the spring of 1974, and discovered that 
it was being farmed by a tenant of a party claiming to own it, 
namely, the Plaintiffs in the principal action. (R 282) 
2. The Respondent, J. H. Ehlers, through his 
attorney, offered to refund the monies paid by the Appellant, 
R. L. Warr. (R 285) 
3. Respondents secured a Preliminary Title Report 
from Utah Title Insurance Company, showing clear title in them at 




APPELLANT FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM IN THE LOWER 
COURT BECAUSE OF APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO TENDER 
THE BALANCE DUE UNDER THE REAL ESTATE CONTRACTS. 
The closest thing that the Appellant did toward paying 
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off the contract was allegedly asking his father to loan him 
the money. (R 275 and 275) The money was never loaned to the 
Appellant by his father and there is no proof that sufficient 
amount was available. There was no application to a bank or 
lending institution. (R 279) Admittedly, there was no tender 
of the balance due on the contracts from the Appellant to the 
Respondent. That such is required is clear from the Supreme 
Court of Utah case of Woodard vs. Allen, 265 P2d 398 (1953). 
In that case, it was held that the seller was not obliged to 
prove marketable title simply because the Defendant raised the 
point in a case where there was a real estate sale on contract 
and where the buyer had not tendered the full purchase price. 
The trial court had found that the seller had no marketable title 
and, hence, no right to relief. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court 
said in effect that the marketablity of the seller's title was 
immaterial until the contract had been paid. As in the Woodard 
case, Warr's demand for a good warranty deed is premature. 
Under the very terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract: 
itself, it provides as follows in paragraph 19: 
"The seller on receiving the payments herein reserved 
to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned agrees to 
execute and deliver to the buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient 
warranty deed conveying the title to the above described premises 
free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and 
except as may have accrued by or through the acts or neglect of the 
buyer and to furnish at his expense, a policy of title insurance in 
the amount of the purchase price or at the option of the seller, an 
abstract brought to date at the time of sale or at any time during 
the term of this agreement or at time of delivery of deed, at the 
option of the buyer," (emphasis added) 
-4-
The payments were never "received". 
A mere offer to pay does not constitute a valid tender, 
the law requires that the tenderer have the money present and 
ready and produce and actually offer it to the other party. See 
74 Am Jur 2d 549, Tender §7, citing Talty vs. Freedmanfs Sav. and 
T. Company, 93 US 321; Somerton State Bank vs. Maxey, 197 P 892; 
Rosencrans vs. Fry, 95 A2d 905; St. Georges Soc. vs. Sawyer, 214 
NW 877; Louisville and N.R. Co. vs. Cottengim, 104 SW 280. 
Until there has been a tender of the purchase price, 
the vendee1 s remedy is recission of the contract due to the vendor's 
inability to convey marketable title, together with a refund of 
monies paid. Actually, there was a mutual mistake of fact by 
both parties at the time of the execution of the contract. At 
that time, the contract seller had lost title by adverse possession 
since the taxes had been paid and the possession maintained for 
seven (7) years prior to the execution of the contract. Under the 
terms of the real estate contract, the contract seller, J. H. 
Ehlers, and the others, were obligated to give the buyer possession 
at that time. Because they had lost the property by adverse 
possession prior to that time, they were unable to so do and 
therefore the breach occurred at that time. Since the damages are 
to be measured as of the date of the breach, assuming the Appellant 
has a cause of action, it occurred when the sellers were unable 
to give possession. At that time, the fair market value of the 
property was the same as the contract price (R 277) and therefore 
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a refund of the contract payments would be the same as 
compensating the buyer in the amount of the fair market value. 
If the breach is considered to be as of the date that the seller 
was unable to give a warranty deed, then it is impossible to 
determine damages because that obligation to so produce a warranty 
deed does not arise until tender of the entire purchase price. 
On the other hand, if the contract purchaser were to 
tender the balance of the purchase price, then the contract 
seller, J. H. Ehlers, would be required to give the purchaser 
a warranty deed and would be in breach of the warranties implied 
therein as set forth in §57-1-12, Utah Code Annotated, as amended 
1953. The measure of damages for breach of such warranties is 
set forth in 20 Am Jur 2d 691, Covenants, Conditions and 
Restrictions, §155. It states as follows: 
"The damages recoverable by the grantee for total breach 
of a covenant of title cannot, as a general rule, be augmented by 
an increase in the value of the land conveyed. This rule applies 
to covenants of seisin, of warranty, and for quiet enjoyment, and 
is applicable whether the increased value results from extrinsic 
causes, such as a general rise in the market price of the real 
estate, or from improvements placed upon the land by the grantee.11 
As the court held in the case of Gerbert vs. Congre-
gation of Sons of Abraham, 35 A 1121, there can be no distinction 
in principle between the damages recoverable by plaintiff upon a 
contract to convey and the damages recoverable upon a covenant 
of warranty upon failure of title and ouster. In that case, the 
court held that the vendee was merely entitled to a refund of 
monies paid, if any, 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ASSESSED THE PROPER 
MEASURE OF DAMAGES BECAUSE OF THE GOOD FAITH 
OF THE RESPONDENTS, ASSUMING THAT THERE WAS 
A PROPER TENDER OF THE BALANCE DUE ON THE REAL 
ESTATE CONTRACTS. 
Respondent is in agreement with that portion of the 
Appellant's brief stating that there is a division of authority 
as to the appropriate measure of damages when it becomes impossible 
for the vendor to convey real property to a purchaser, (Appellant's 
brief, page 4.) Many jurisdictions make a determination of whether 
the vendee is entitled to out-of-pocket loss or benefit of the 
bargain depending upon whether there was any bad faith on the part 
of the vendor. The lower court specifically found that the Responden 
negotiated the real estate contracts in good faith and acted in good 
faith throughout the transaction and that their inability to give 
good title is not caused by any of their acts. (Finding of Fact #8) 
It is the Respondent's position that the weight of 
authority makes such a distinction and only allows the vendee to 
recover the benefit of the bargain when the vendor acted in bad 
faith. See 77 Am Jur 2d 647, Vendor and Purchaser, §519, which 
states as follows: 
"When, however, the vendor has acted in good faith but 
is unable to carry out the contract because of some defect in the 
title, recovery by the purchaser for loss of his bargain is denied 
by the weight of authority.If 
This was published in 1975. 
Because of the split of authority and the confusion which 
it has caused, some jurisdictions have made the damages distinction 
statutory, The following language appears identically in the 
Statutes of California, Montana and Oklahoma: 
"The detriment caused by the breach of an agreement to 
convey an estate in real property, is deemed to be the price paid, 
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and the expenses properly incurred in examining the title and 
preparing the necessary papers, with interest thereon; but 
adding thereto, in the case of bad faith, the difference between 
the price agreed to be paid and the value of the estate agreed to 
be conveyed, at the time of the breach and the expenses properly 
incurred in preparing to enter upon the land.n California Civil 
Code §3306; Revised Code of Montana 1947 §17-306; 23 Okl. St. Ann. 
§27. 
It does not appear that the reasons for codification 
were to change common law, but rather that it was done for 
clarification. As the court held in the case of Shaw v. Union 
Escrow and Realty Company, 200 P 25 (1921), at page 27, nTo our 
mind the code provisions have added nothing to the law already 
established when it is declared that in case only of bad faith 
on the part of the vendor, damages may be recovered because of 
profits which might have accrued to the purchaser." The court 
was referring to §3306 of the California Civil Code as referred 
to above. 
Even in those states where there is no statute clarifying 
the rule of damages, the weight of authority, as stated above, 
is in support of the rule that determines damages on the basis of 
the good or bad faith of the vendor. Among these states is the 
State of New York. See Valley Associates Corp. vs. Rogers, 158 
NYS 2d 231; Mokar Properties Corp. vs. Hall, 179 NYS 2d 814; 
Spuches vs. Royal View Inc., 202 NYS 2d 51; Montagnino vs. Broj er, 
214 NYS 2d 208. 
Among the Western States, other than those referred to, 
it is often unknown which rule of damages would be applied in this 
type of situation, although the States of Washington, Arizona and 
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Nevada clearly follow the good faith-bad faith distinction 
as far as damages are concerned. See Parchen vs. Rowley, 
82 P2d 857 (1938); Cole vs. Atkins, 209 P2d 859 (1949); 
Masani vs. Quilici, 218 P2d 946 (1950), respectively. 
The law in Utah is not clear. The case of Bunnell vs. 
Bills, 13 U2d 83, 368, P2d 597 (1962), wherein the court said 
that the measure of damages is the market value of the property 
at the time of the breach, less the contract price, involved 
a factual situation which is distinguishable from the case in 
concern and is also a case that would come within the realm of 
nbad faith" on the part of the vendor. The vendor, who was also 
buying on contract, at the time of his contract to sell, did not 
have legal title to the property and knew that he did not have 
legal title and also must have known that he would never receive 
legal title to the property due to his financial situation. In 
the case before this court, the seller, in good faith, believed 
that he had legal title which at one time he did, through a tax 
deed, and Utah Title Company sustained him in that reasonable 
belief by issuing a Preliminary Title Report showing such title 
to the property to be in him, jointly with the other Respondents. 
Thus, we have a case of first impression in which the damages 
rule has not been construed as applied to these types of facts. 
The case of Shaw v. Union Escrow and Realty Company, 
supra, as referred to by the Appellant in support of the proposition 
that negligence is sufficient to satisfy the bad faith requirement, 
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involved a case where again there was bad faith in excess of 
mere neglect. In that case, since the knowledge of the agents 
of the corporate seller is imputed to the corporation, the 
corporation was selling property that had been previously conveyed 
to a prior purchaser and the corporation knew of such conveyance. 
Clearly, this is not our case. 
It must also be remembered that Appellant was also 
negligent in failing to discover the presence of an adverse 
possessor. Appellant is bound by the findings of fact entered 
in the principal action which are as follows: 
"11. That at all times continuously from November 25, 
1930, up to and including the present time that the plaintiffs, 
or other persons acting with the plaintiffs1 permission or under 
the plaintiffs' direction or control have had exclusive, complete, 
actual, open, notorious, hostile and continuous undisputed poss-
ession of the real property which forms the subject matter of 
this lawsuit.Tf 
Appellant's actual knowledge of the existence of the 
adverse possessors is also evident from the additional facts set 
forth in this Respondent's Statement of Facts, There are several 
cases holding that where the buyer knew of the defect in the 
seller's title, that upon the failure of the seller to convey 
good title, the buyer is limited in damages to those out-of-pocket. 
48 ALR 50 (f). Thus, it was held in the case of Garcia vs. 
Yvaguirre, 213 SW 236 (1919), that where the vendee knew, at the 
time of entering into the contract for the purchase of land, that 
the vendor had no title thereto, and there was no fraud upon the 
part of the vendor, the vendee can recover only the amount he has 
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paid on the contract, if any, and such special damages, not 
including the loss of his bargain, as he may allege or prove. 
POINT III 
EVEN WHERE A VENDEE IS ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT 
OF THE BARGAIN, IT IS DETERMINED BY THE VALUE 
OF THE PROPERTY AS OF THE DATE OF THE CONTRACT. 
The difficulty with determining the fair market value 
of the property, even assuming that the Appellant is entitled to 
such, is determining the date to be used in establishing such. 
As has been pointed out, the breach actually occurred when the 
vendor was unable to deliver possession of the property. If such 
a time were used, then a refund of the purchase price would be 
the same amount as paying the fair market value of the property. 
(R. 277 & 278) 
It is unfortunate that the Appellant did not take or 
attempt to take possession of the property at the time of the 
contract. If he had done so, it would have been discovered that 
the property was being adversely possessed and damages could have 
been determined at that time before any rise in market value. 
Actually the property had been lost by adverse possession prior to 
the execution of these real estate contracts. 
If the breach did not occur when the vendee was unable 
to take possession, then it becomes difficult to determine when it 
did occur. This is because there never was a tender of the contract 
balance. Nevertheless, in some of the jurisdictions which allow 
the vendee the benefit of the bargain, it is determined by determining 
the market value of the property at the time the contract was 
executed. For example, see Raisor vs. Jackson, 225 SW 2d 647, 
where a vendor unconditionally agreed to convey realty knowing he 
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had no title and with knowledge of an outstanding interest therein 
owned by a third-party and where the vendor breached his agreement 
it was held that the purchaser may recover the difference between 
the contract price and reasonable market value of realty at time 
contract was executed; Montagnino vs. Brojer, supra. 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT 
THE APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO COSTS OF 
COURT OR ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Since the Respondents agreed to refund the contract 
payments, together with interest, there was no need for the cross-
claim of the Appellant and therefore attorney's fees in connection 
therewith should be denied. (R. 285). Costs of court should also 
be denied for the same reason. 
CONCLUSION 
The cross-complaint should either be dismissed for 
insufficient tender and if not the lower court should be affirmed as 
to the measure of damages. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Milton V. Backman 
David B. Boyce 
Attorneys for Respondent Ehlers 
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